

# Cloud Security Maturity Framework: Best practices to operationalize cloud security



# Cloud is the biggest transformation security has experienced



We've tried different approaches for over a decade



## Unified platform for the modern cloud security operating model





# Introducing the Cloud Security Maturity Framework

Best practices from customers

Taken from thousands of customers including 40% of the Fortune 100



#### **Cloud Security Maturity** Framework ····-8 Ó Gain Visibility **Reduce Critical Risk Democratize Security Develop Securely Respond to Threats** 5: Remove critical risks 5: Dev teams self-service 5: Complete multi-cloud visibility remediate issues and across clouds maintain compliance 3: Agent-based visibility or 3: Remove critical risks from a 3: Security sends issues to single cloud/account visibility single cloud/architecture developers and developers remediate I: No visibility Risk reduction programs in single domains Security is fully owned by security teams

Complete multi-cloud visibility


Best practice: Scan the cloud without agents for full visibility across:

- Cloud
- Orchestration
- Serverless
- Containers
- VMs
- PaaS



# Visibility into risks across cloud

- Misconfigurations
- Vulnerabilities
- Malware
- Sensitive data
- External exposure
- Excessive permissions
- Exposed secrets
- Lateral movement
- Al risks
- Novel vulnerabilities and attacks
- Business impact



Visibility into critical attack paths that need to be prioritized



## Best practice: Focus on fixing toxic combinations

#### O1 CSPM

Workload with a public IP (doesn't equal external exposure)

#### **O2** Vulnerabilities


Critical CVE

#### O3 CIEM

Admin permissions, which are excessive

#### 04 DSPM

Sensitive PII data found in a database



## Best practice: Focus on fixing toxic combinations

### O1 CSPM

Workload with a public IP (doesn't equal external exposure)

#### **O2** Vulnerabilities


Critical CVE

### O3 CIEM


Admin permissions, which are excessive

#### 04 DSPM

Sensitive PII data found in a database



## Risk-based approach to vulnerability management in the cloud



**Critical and High** vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities with a public exploit

Vulnerable resources with public network exposure


Vulnerable and exposed resources with access to crown jewels

## Best practice: Zero-day response to high profile threats

Automated Threat Center to show the Zero-day indicators of the Emerging threats you need to pay attention to, including CISA, CERT-EU, and private research.

<b>⊘</b>		Critical Vulnerability in Argo CD         May 21, 2024, source: Wiz Threat Research         Researchers discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2024-31989) in Argo CD, a popular GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes, with a severity score of 9.1. This vulnerability leverages Argo CD's elevated permissions to allow attackers to escalate their privileges and potentially gain control over Kubernetes clusters. The vulnerability exploits the unsecured Redis caching server used by Argo CD, enabling attackers to manipulate application state manifests, deploy malicious pods, and access sensitive information.       O
	0	<ul> <li>Critical Vulnerability in Git May 19, 2024, source: Wiz Threat Research</li> <li>New versions of Git have been released, addressing five vulnerabilities, including the critical CVE-2024-32002, which allows remote code execution during a "clone" operation. This flaw lets malicious repositories trick Git into miswriting files, enabling unauthorized code execution without user inspection. It is recommended to upgrade Git to a patched version.</li> <li>vulnerability critical rce</li> </ul>
0	<b>\$</b>	APT28 Targeting Print Spooler Vulnerability for GooseEgg Deployment         Apr 24, 2024, source: Wiz Threat Research         Microsoft Threat Intelligence has disclosed activities by the Russian-based threat actor Forest Blizzard, also known as APT28 or Fancy Bear, linked to GRU's Unit 26165. Forest Blizzard has been exploiting CVE-2022-38028, a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler service, since at least June 2020 to deploy a custom malware known as GooseEgg. These attacks have been targeting sectors such as government, non-governmental organizations, education, and transportation across Ukraine, Western Europe, and North America. In addition to CVE-2022-38028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, the group has exploited other critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2023-28028, Vulnerable     9     Vulnerable     Vulnerable
		malware APT28 in-the-wild Forest Blizzard Fancy Bear

### Best Practice: Make cloud security a team sport



### Democratization checklist:

- Answer the "so what" question
- ✓ Visualize for clarity
- Support by evidence
- Clear remediation description
- Provided remediation code
- Automation & workflow ready
- Code context for cloud-natives


## Democratize security visibility

Determine cloud ownership by team



## Automate so dev teams can self-serve

Embed automation into existing dev workflows







# FOX

"Wiz allows us to achieve our philosophy of how to democratize security – scaling the cybersecurity team's reach through technology."



Melody Hildebrandt CIO,

FOX Corp

### H E A R S T

"So I don't even need to ship these reports to people. I just give the team access to the tool and we're able to watch them burn [risks] it down to zero."



#### Steven Craig

Senior Director, Cloud Center of Excellence, Hearst Enterprise Technology Securing data and AI development in cloud is a difficult and costly problem





of cloud environments already use cloud Al services

According to Wiz's State of AI 2024 report



of companies have at least 50% one database or storage bucket exposed to the internet

According to Wiz's State of the Cloud 2023 report



#### average cost of a data breach

According to IBM's Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

## Best practice: Continuously discover sensitive data and reduce its risk

#### Establish broad discovery

- Discover PII, PHI, PCI, and secrets across your cloud estate
- Leverage CNAPP to scan any cloud, any architecture

#### Prioritize critical data exposure

- Remove external exposure via network or identity
- Ensure **access governance** to continuously reduce broad internal exposure


Automate compliance assessments

• Continuously assess compliance to ensure standards are consistent across the cloud

ata Findings				
2 Search rules	Resource Type V Severity V Data Type	Classification Rule      Subscription	Location V + More 25 rules 42	
ROUP BY Resource Location	Classification Rule None			
Classification Rule	Severity	Findings Subscriptions Locations	0	3
Email PII	High	75 00 6 🗅 📑 🚍 🗖		
PII Deleted classification rule	None	36 M 5 🛆 📕 🚍 🗖		
Deleted classification rule	None	34 00 5 🗅 📕 🚍 📘		
PII Name	High	31 00 4 🗅 📕 🚍 🛱	13 <b></b>	
Credit Cards Financial	🗅 All projects 🗸 📄 View 🗸		<b>(</b> )	Q Search Ctrl+K 💀 🐢 🔊 😗
Digital Identity	Cloud Entitlements			🖺 Save as >
🗢 Digitalldentity/IP Add	FIND IDENTITY Specific Identity V OR	Native Type is IAM Role > + More	Reset	Showing first 27 results
Digitalldentity/IP Addr	WITH ACCESS Permission ~ OR A	ccess Type is High Privilege > Reset		
Digitalldentity/IP Add	TO RESOURCE Specific Resource V OR	Native Type V Has Data Findings equals	True V Type is Database V	
🗢 Digitalldentity/IP Add		Native Type V Has Data Findings equals		
😁 Digitalldentity/IP Add				
View all 25 data findir	VIEW Table -& Graph			
-	Identity DevOpsAdminAcme	Access Type Resource	Permissions	Identity Inactive in the last 90 days 🔞
	Amazon Web Services IAM Role (Service Account	) Amazon Web	Services RDS Aurora MySQL Cluster (Da	No
	Amazon Web Services IAM Role (Service Account	Amazon Web	Services RDS Aurora MySQL Cluster (Da	No
	DevOpsAdminPaymentItay	Amazon Woh	Services DDS Aurors MuSOL Cluster (Da 🔞 10 permissions	🛆 Yes
DSPM Compliar	ice Scores		\$ *	🛆 Yes
			* 15	🛆 Yes
		1224	5	No
HT	SOC2	<b>a</b>	PCI	No
HITRUST CSF v9.	5.0 SOC 2	GDPR	PCI DSS v3.2.1	🛆 Yes
44%	49%	51%	51%	
_				
ISO	NIST		NIST	
	NIST SP 800-53 R	HIPAA Security Ru	NIST 800-171 Rev.2	
ISO/IEC 2700				
ISO/IEC 2700 <sup>-</sup> 64%	68%	79%	89%	

## State of AI Report by Wiz Research<sup>(1)</sup>: AI is already here. 70% of cloud environments already use cloud AI services







## Best Practice: Secure Al data by tracing the pipeline

#### End-to-end Al pipeline visibility

• Detect every resource in Al pipelines, from machines hosting training jobs to data stores

#### Deep risk analysis in AI pipelines

- Identify AI vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, permissions, data, secrets, and network exposure
- Scan Al Models like you would scan any container
   image


#### Remove critical attack paths to AI models


 Prioritize and proactively fix the risks that create attack paths to sensitive data

○ Comment ▷ Run an Action	Create a Ticket 🖸 O Past Activities	S Give Feedback S C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
verview Remediation Comments		
vidence		
Attack Path Visualization		문 💐 View on Security Graph
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	CWE-502
	Hosted model 1	Finding
	Hosted Al Model (Al Model)	
	• • • • • • • • • • •	
CWE-502	Docor	ription
Real Finding		nodel file model.bin which was detected
		root/models/b'calc' imports risky ts which may pose a security risk and allow
	testing-models arbitr	ary code execution or other unexpected ity risks.
		the source of the model - if it was
+ CWE-502	shoul	loaded from an untrusted source, the model d not be executed in a sensitive
Finding	If the	model was downloaded from a trusted
		e or developed internally, ensure that the imports are necessary, as they could allow



## Cloud Security Maturity Framework





#### **Democratize Security**

5: Dev teams self-service remediate issues and maintain compliance

3: Security sends issues to developers and developers remediate

1: Security is fully owned by security teams

#### **Develop Securely**

5: Implement hardened golden pipelines to reduce drift


3: Implement policies in a limited number of pipelines

1: Developer ownership of apps and infrastructure known or partially known

#### **Respond to Threats**

## Gearing to the left: Build securely by design






## Cloud Security Maturity Framework



## Best practice: prepare your cloud for a breach

#### Mature your Incident Response Readiness

- **Continuously evaluate** your visibility to ensure you eliminate all gaps
- **Prioritize and collect** the telemetry you need to analyze both runtime and logs
- Be ready with Forensics and Response Playbooks
- Ensure you're ready to capture forensic data quickly – and don't chase to get access to images during a crisis
- Create response playbooks for each type of cloud threat




# Best practice: broaden your cloud-native visibility and detection coverage

Align on a unified schema for all cloud data

• **Centralize telemetry** in a single data store for analytics, detection and investigation

#### Implement cross-layer detection

- Correlate signals for detection across the identity, data, network, compute, and control planes
- Contextualize to reduce noise



# Best practice: empower your SOC with cloud expertise and broad context

Level-up your cloud-native threat investigation and response skillset

- **Build the skills** on your team needed to triage and investigate cloud threats
- Bring context from across cloud, identity and dev

Timeline (I	JTC) 21	3		
05:20:03 PI April 30, 202		GitHub PR Merge <b>O</b>	GitHub PR <b>#2443 Downgrade nginx version to debug issue</b> merged into branch main of GitHub repository infra-scripts by jack.mcdougal@acme.com	
05:26:17 PM April 30. 202		Create Deployment 💿	New EKS container <b>nginx</b> created on EKS cluster <b>prod-1</b> by CircleCI workflow <b>nginx-</b> deployment	
07:12:29 PM April 30. 202		New SSH connection to EKS container 🔹	SSH connection was established to EKS container <b>nginx f</b> rom IP address <b>213.8.87.118</b> (Proton VPN)	
07:19:43 PM April 30. 202		Suspicious connection to IMDS 🛛 👄	Connection to the AWS Instance Meta Data Service (IMDS) with query /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ established by Process Dash	
11:48:30 PM April 30. 202		DescribeInstances a 2	Request for details on all EC2 instances performed in AWS account <b>acme-prod</b> by IAM role <b>AwsAutomationarchiveRole</b>	
11:49:09 PM April 30. 202		ListBuckets 🛆 3	Request for details on all S3 buckets performed in AWS account <b>acme-prod</b> by IAM role <b>AwsAutomationarchiveRole</b>	
02:35:47 AM May 1. 202		GetObject 🖻 97	Resource downloaded from S3 bucket <b>client-data</b> (which contains sensitive data) by IAM role <b>AwsAutomationarchiveRole</b>	
02:36:02 AM May 1. 202		ServiceNow Ticket Created	Automatically created t	
02:36:05 At May 1. 202		Slack Validation Sent 🐇	Automatically sent valic	
03:01:14 AM May 1. 202		Comment	Not sure about this one dave.lambert@acme.c 213.8.87.118 AwsAutomationarchiveRole client-data United Stated IAM Role S3 Bucket	
03:28:09 AM May 1. 202		PutBucketLifecycle	Lifecycle for S3 bucket- IAM role AwsAutomatia	
			nginx bash /latest/meta-data/ia EKS Container Process security-credential Query	

## Best practice: fix at the root and drive resilience

#### Collaborate with dev to respond faster


 Effectively collaborate with cloud security and developers to remediate issues

#### Drive resilience

 Every incident is an opportunity to become more resilient, fixing root cause issues

🖂 Email 🕴 🙀 Slack			Impact	
Isolate traffic of EKS contain	iner <b>ngnix</b>			
👔 AWS CLI 🔷 Cre	eate Ticket O Create	ə Ticket 💽 Run	- 1 D Impact	
Aquire volume snapshots o	of EKS container <b>ngnix</b>			
👔 AWS CLI 🔥 Ore	aata Tickat		11.	
👔 AWS CLI 🔶 Oro		ulnerability impacts github.com/do		CVE-2024-24557.
AWS CLI	The following v		ocker/docker versions <24.0.9:	CVE-2024-24557.
	The following v	ulnerability impacts github.com/do	ocker/docker versions <24.0.9:	CVE-2024-24557.
Delete lifecycle config	The following v It can be remed	ulnerability impacts <b>github.com/dc</b> liated by updating to version <b>24.0.9</b> ge	ocker/docker versions <24.0.9:	CVE-2024-24557.
Delete lifecycle config	The following v It can be remed	ulnerability impacts <b>github.com/dc</b> liated by updating to version <b>24.0.9</b> ge	ocker/docker versions <24.0.9: 0 or higher. .0.7+incompatible // indirect	CVE-2024-24557.
Delete lifecycle config	The following v It can be remed Suggested chan	ulnerability impacts github.com/do liated by updating to version 24.0.9 ge github.com/docker/docker v24	ocker/docker versions <24.0.9: 0 or higher. .0.7+incompatible // indirect	CVE-2024-24557. Commit suggestion
Delete lifecycle config	The following v It can be remed Suggested chan	ulnerability impacts github.com/do liated by updating to version 24.0.9 ge github.com/docker/docker v24	ocker/docker versions <24.0.9: 0 or higher. .0.7+incompatible // indirect	

#### Cloud security as an organization-wide tool to democratize



Democratization



